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The Alice Corporation held a series of patents related to a
computerized system to mitigate the risk of non-payment in the
settlement of trading obligations.1 CLS Bank International
filed suit seeking a judgment that Alice Corp.’s patents were
invalid.2 The district court found the patents to be invalid
because they attempted to claim an abstract idea3 rather than
a specific “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.”4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court decision,5 but on rehearing
en banc the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding
that Alice Corp.’s patents failed to include patent-eligible
subject matter.6 The Supreme Court affirmed the en banc
Federal Circuit decision.7
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1. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349–50 (2014).
2. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228 (D.D.C.
2011).
3. Id. at 255.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
5. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 685 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
6. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
7. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349–50 (2014)
(“Because the claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, they are
not patent eligible under § 101.”).
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CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. illustrates the
conflicted state of case law on the patentability of software.8
Patents are not allowed to claim abstract ideas.9 Software, by
its very nature, must incorporate abstract ideas.10 There is
currently no defined test for whether a patent that incorporates
abstract ideas impermissibly claims those ideas.11 This case
potentially called into doubt the validity of hundreds of
thousands of software patents.12
This Comment analyzes the criteria for determining when
a patent impermissibly claims an abstract idea. Section I
examines the relevant patent law and controlling cases
analyzing patents that incorporate abstract ideas. Section II
describes the Federal Circuit’s opinion in CLS Bank
International v. Alice Corp. Pty.13 Section III analyzes the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision and proposes a three-
prong test to evaluate whether a patent that incorporates an
abstract idea is valid or not. This Comment concludes that the
Supreme Court should adopt the proposed three-prong test as a
clear standard for evaluating patents that claim an abstract
idea.
8. See id.; Fenwick & West, LLP, Federal Circuit Undecided About
Whether Software Is Patentable?, LEXOLOGY (June 25, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0fa7d1d4-b101-4eaf-85f9-4ea5a
fb1c6c8 (“The result of the various opinions in CLS Bank is that, on appeal,
the patentability of a software patent will vary with the specific composition of
the appellate panel.”).
9. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853) (“[T]he
discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not
patentable.”).
10. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1320–21 (acknowledging that
although software may be more of an abstract idea compared to a physical
computer, adding the software to a computer does not convert the completed
product into an abstract idea).
11. E.g., Fenwick & West, LLP, supra note 8 (“Furthermore, there was no
majority agreement on what is the proper test for determining whether claims
are invalid under § 101.”).
12. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1313 (“And let’s be clear: if all of these
claims, including the system claims, are not patent-eligible, this case is the
death of hundreds of thousands of patents . . . .”).
13. Id.
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I. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAW
A patent on an invention is defined as:
[A]n intellectual property right granted by the Government of the
United States of America to an inventor ‘to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout
the United States or importing the invention into the United States’
for a limited time in exchange for public disclosure of the invention
when the patent is granted.14
Patents encourage new and useful inventions by granting
the inventors the legal rights to their invention.15 This prevents
a competitor from promptly copying and stealing an inventor’s
work.16 Patent law comes from three sources: the original grant
of authority in the Constitution, statutory authority under
§ 101 of U.S.C. Title 35 and subsequent case law by federal
courts.17
A. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
During the Medieval period in England the sovereign
granted patents on an ad hoc basis.18 These patents could be
granted for already existing items and were often more to
benefit the purse of the sovereign than the public good.19 In
1624 the English Parliament sought to tip the scales in favor of
the public good by passing the Statute of Monopolies, which
limited patents to fourteen years and only for “manners of new
manufacture.”20 The Statute of Monopolies also prohibited
patents that were “mischievous to the state” or “generally
14. What Is a Patent?, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov
/patents/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
15. Aaron Larson, Patent Law, EXPERTLAW (Sept. 2003),
http://www.expertlaw.com/library/intellectual_property/patent_law.html.
16. Id.
17. See Debra D. Peterson, Can This Brokered Marriage Be Saved? The
Changing Relationship Between the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit in
Patent Law Jurisprudence, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 202
(2003).
18. A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States, LADAS& PARRY
LLP (May 7, 2014), http://ladas.com/a-brief-history-of-the-patent-law-of-the
-united-states-2 [hereinafter Brief History] (“In medieval times, the grant of
exclusive rights ‘monopolies’ by the sovereign had been a convenient way in
which the sovereign could raise money without the need to resort to taxation.
Such grants were common in many European countries.”).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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inconvenient.”21 French patent law, however, chose to focus on
an inventor’s right to his or her invention over the general
public good.22 The French viewed invention as “the
presentation of a service rendered to Society” and thought it
“just that he who has rendered this service should be
compensated by Society that received it.”23
In the United States the granting of patents is one of the
Enumerated Powers given to Congress.24 Article I, Section 8
states that Congress shall have the power “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”25 This approach sought to
organize the often inconsistent system of granting patents and
balance the public interest of acquiring new and novel
inventions against the private interest of inventors to retain
the rights to their invention.26
B. UNITED STATES CODE TITLE 35
Pursuant to the specific grant of Congressional authority
in the Constitution, patents in the United States are codified in
Title 35 of the United States Code.27 Sections 101 through 103
of Title 35 lay out specific requirements for a patent.28
Section 101 spells out what types of inventions can be
patented.29 It states that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. Id.; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 630–35 (2010) (chronicling
the history of “Early American Patent Law”).
26. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989) (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to
encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle
competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and
useful Arts.’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Brief History, supra note
18.
27. E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2012).
28. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 101; Holland King, Software Patentability After
Prometheus, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2014) (“Generally, the well-
known maxim regarding subject matter patent eligibility is that “anything
under the sun that is made by man” is patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C § 101.”) (citations omitted).
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of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent . . . .”30 This statutory language has repeatedly
been interpreted by the Supreme Court as barring the
patenting of abstract ideas.31 The Court recognizes that giving
a patent holder an exclusive right to abstract ideas or general
scientific principles could perhaps stimulate his or her
research, but it would severely limit future invention and
research by others in that area.32
Section 102 is referred to as the novelty requirement.33 It
states that a person shall receive a patent unless the invention
is already patented, has been published, or is in public use.34
This ensures that inventors are disclosing new and novel
inventions and not patenting something that is already known
or in use by others.35
Section 103 is the obviousness requirement.36 Section 103
requires that:
A patent . . . may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.37
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
31. Rebecca Hanovice & Jonathan A. Muenkel, US Patent Law and the
Supreme Court: A Year in Review, ACC DOCKET, Nov. 2014, at 90, 91–100;
William J. Cass & Chad A. Denver, Overcoming Section 101 Challenges For
Patent Holders, CORP. COUNS., June 2012, at 1, 1, available at
http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Overcomingsection101challeng
es1.pdf (“A unanimous Court in both decisions reaffirmed that U.S. patent law
prohibits patent protection for abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural
phenomena.”).
32. Cass & Denver, supra note 31 (“A rigid rule or categorical ban on
patents for ‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress,’ would
frustrate the purpose of patent law.”) (citation omitted).
33. Mike Ervin, What Is 35 USC 102 and Patent Novelty?, BUS. PATS.,
http://www.the-business-of-patents.com/35-usc-102.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2014).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
35. See Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3091, 3098 & nn.22–27 (2014) (summarizing commentary about the perceived
differences between patent validity and assessment of patent quality); Ervin,
supra note 33.
36. 35 USC 103: What Is Obviousness? It Is Not Always Obvious, BUS.
PATS., http://www.the-business-of-patents.com/35-usc-103.html (last visited
Nov. 20, 2014).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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A patent cannot be obtained if, based on what was known
in that field at the time, the invention would be obvious to
someone familiar with that field.38 While an invention may be
useful and novel it is not in the public interest to allow an
inventor to make and then patent a trivial improvement.39
C. CASE LAW
The case law surrounding patents has consistently held
that abstract ideas are not patentable, with few exceptions.40
One of the oldest cases in this area involves the inventor of the
venerable telegraph, Samuel Morse.41 Morse was the first
person to invent an electric telegraph that could transmit
signals over long distances.42 In his patent for the device—in
addition to the claims describing the device—Morse made the
following claim:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of
machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the
essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the
electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however
developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or
letters at any distances, being a new application of that power, of
which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.43
Morse was claiming not only his own device but also any
system using electric current to transmit signals at a
distance.44 In O’Reilly v. Morse,45 the Supreme Court
38. 35 USC 103: What Is Obviousness? It Is Not Always Obvious, supra
note 36. A thorough discussion of § 103 is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For additional background materials on obviousness and nonobviousness, see
Christopher A. Cotropia, Predictability and Nonobviousness in Patent Law
After KSR, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 391, 395–437 (2014).
39. See Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness,
82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 41 (2008) (stating that the true benefit of patents is
not the creation of an invention, but rather the acceleration of inventions
incentivized by the patent system).
40. See Jeremy D. Roux, The Supreme Court and § 101 Jurisprudence:
Reconciling Subject-Matter Patentability Standards and the Abstract Idea
Exception, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 639 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
1048, 1056 (1981)).
41. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 62 (1853).
42. Id. (crediting Morse as “the first and original inventor of the electro-
magnetic telegraph”); see Mary Bellis, The Communication Revolution:
Samuel Morse & the Telegraph, ABOUT.COM INVENTORS, http://inventors
.about.com/od/indrevolution/a/telegraph.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
43. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 86.
44. Id. at 87.
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invalidated Morse’s famous eighth claim by holding that an
abstract idea or natural principle is not patentable.46
A case in the early 20th century, Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co.,47 had a similar holding to Morse.48 The case
dealt with certain bacteria that allowed crops to fix
atmospheric nitrogen for their use.49 Different types of bacteria
were required for different crops and mixing the bacteria
inhibited nitrogen fixing.50 Kalo Inoculant Co. discovered a
series of the nitrogen-fixing bacteria that did not interfere with
each other and could be used on any kind of crop.51 When Kalo
Inoculant Co. sued to stop infringement of its bacteria mix
patent the Supreme Court invalidated the patent as lacking
invention and merely an application of natural principles.52
The Court held that the phenomena of nature “are part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men”53 and should be “free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none.”54
In Gottschalk v. Benson the Supreme Court considered a
computer programmed to execute an abstract idea.55 Benson
filed a patent for a program to convert binary-coded decimal
numbers into pure binary numbers.56 The Court acknowledged
that “[a]n idea of itself is not patentable”57 and that the
abstract mathematical formula used in the program had no
45. Id. at 119–20.
46. Id. at 115–16.
47. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
48. Compare id. at 128–32 (“Even though it may have been the product of
skill, it certainly was not the product of invention. There is no way in which
we could call it such unless we borrowed invention from the discovery of the
natural principle itself.”), with Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 115–16.
49. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 127.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 130.
52. Id. at 131–32 (“That is to say, there is no invention here unless the
discovery that certain strains of the several species of these bacteria are non-
inhibitive and may thus be safely mixed is invention.”).
53. Id. at 130.
54. Id.
55. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972) (“The claims were not
limited to any particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or
machinery, or to any particular end use.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 67 (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
498, 507 (1874)).
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practical use except when used with a computer.58 The Court
held that the patent would prohibit any other use of the
formula and would effectively be a patent on the formula
itself.59
In a similar case, Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court
reviewed a patent for a mathematical formula used when
calculating and updating alarm values used in catalytic
conversion in the refining industry.60 While the formula could
be computed by hand, it was primarily useful, as disclosed in
the patent, to be executed on a computer.61 This case is
distinguished from Benson because the patent only sought to
claim the use of the formula in the refining industry and the
computer also performed additional activity after the
calculation was completed,62 while the patent in Benson
claimed every application of the formula and performed no
additional steps.63 Nonetheless, the Court invalidated the
patent by holding that while a patent can incorporate a
mathematical formula, it must include some other inventive
concept to be valid.64 Finding no such inventive concept in the
patent, the Parker Court declined to “expand patent rights” and
explicitly deferred the issue to Congress.65
As years progressed, the Supreme Court diverged from the
trend of invalidating patents containing abstract ideas in
Diamond v. Diehr.66 In Diehr, the Court reviewed a process for
molding raw rubber into cured products.67 The applicants had
developed a method for measuring the internal temperature of
a mold, calculating the cure time using a mathematical formula
programmed into a computer, and signaling the mold to open at
58. Id. at 71.
59. Id. at 72.
60. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978).
61. Id. (“The only difference between the conventional methods of
changing alarm limits and that described in respondent’s application rests in
the second step–the mathematical algorithm or formula.”).
62. Id. at 589–90.
63. Benson, 409 U.S. at 65.
64. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590–94 (“The notion that post-solution activity, no
matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.”).
65. See id. at 594–95 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,
406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)).
66. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981).
67. Id. at 177.
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the proper time similar to the system in Flook.68 While
acknowledging the limitations of Benson and Flook,69 the Court
held that this patent was a well-developed “industrial process
for the molding of rubber products” rather than merely an
attempt to patent an abstract mathematical formula.70
In Bilski v. Kappos the Supreme Court again refused to
uphold a patent incorporating an abstract idea.71 The patent
application claimed a series of steps for hedging risk in the
energy industry and a simple mathematical formula
incorporating them.72 In examining the patent the Court
reiterated the three exceptions to patent-eligibility under § 101:
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”73
The Court held that risk-hedging is a basic economic technique
and allowing a patent on risk-hedging would be a monopoly on
an abstract idea.74
In a more recent case on the matter, Mayo Collaborative
Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court
examined a patent owned by Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. for
the treatment of autoimmune diseases using thiopurine
drugs.75 The patent detailed a process where doctors
administered drugs to the patient, measured the level of
metabolites in the blood as a result, and adjusted the dosage
according to formulas based on natural biological principles.76
The Court recognized the history of jurisprudence running
through its previous cases in holding that an abstract idea or
68. Id. at 177–79; Flook, 437 U.S. at 585–86.
69. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92.
70. Id. at 192–93.
71. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 593–94 (2010).
72. Id. at 596–601 (“The question in this case turns on whether a patent
can be issued for a claimed invention designed for the business world. The
patent application claims a procedure for instructing buyers and sellers how to
protect against the risk of price fluctuations in a discrete section of the
economy.”).
73. Id. at 602 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980)).
74. Id. at 611–13 (“These claims attempt to patent the use of the abstract
idea of hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct use of well-known
random analysis techniques to help establish some of the inputs into the
equation.”).
75. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1290 (2012).
76. Id. at 1296–98.
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law of nature cannot be patented.77 In doing so, the Court held
that the activity in Mayo was “well understood, routine,
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific
community”78 and was “not sufficient to transform
unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications
of those regularities.”79
II. CASE DESCRIPTION
CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. addressed the
validity of a series of patents for managing settlement risk
when two parties conduct a financial transaction.80 These
patents incorporated abstract ideas about managing risk into a
computerized system to execute them.81 The Federal Circuit
was faced with the same issues addressed in the previous cases
as to whether this computerized system impermissibly claimed
the abstract ideas it incorporated.82
The court first addressed the analysis used for determining
if subject matter is patent-eligible or not83 by citing the four
statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter, novelty,
and non-obvious requirements in §§ 101, 102, and 103 of Title
35 United States Code.84 It then cited the three judicial
exceptions set forth in Benson: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”85 The court then described the
basic steps of analyzing patent eligibility, which are to
determine if in an invention falls into one of the first four
categories and does not fall into one of the second three.86 If it
77. Id. at 1293 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
78. Id. at 1298.
79. Id.
80. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 1277 (“The underlying concern is that patents covering such
elemental concepts would reach too far and claim too much, on balance
obstructing rather than catalyzing innovation.”).
83. Id. at 1276.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1277 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
86. Id. (“If the invention falls within one of the statutory categories, we
must then determine whether any of the three judicial exceptions nonetheless
bars such a claim—is the claim drawn to a patent-ineligible law of nature,
natural phenomenon, or abstract idea?”).
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satisfies both prongs of this test, then an invention is
patentable.87
The court went on to acknowledge that this simple test
has, in practice, proven challenging to apply.88 “The difficulty
lies in consistently and predictably differentiating between, on
the one hand, claims that would tie up laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas, and, on the other, claims that
merely ‘embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply’ those
fundamental tools.”89 The court stated that what is necessary is
a system in making this determination and that Supreme
Court precedents provide the outline for a system based on the
probability of a claim monopolizing a fundamental concept.90
After reviewing several influential Supreme Court cases on
this subject91 the court identified several common themes that
could be used in analyzing Alice.92 The first is that a claim
should not be allowed to preclude the full scope of a
fundamental concept.93 Preemption within the confines of the
patent is allowed,94 but there must be some claims that reduce
the limits of the coverage below the broadest range of the
fundamental concept.95 Second, the court observed that this
analysis could not be formalistic or it would be easily evaded
and left behind by the progress of technology.96 A
functionalistic approach is necessary to consider how a claim
truly affects the goal of “preserving the ‘basic tools’ of scientific
discovery for common use.”97
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1277–80 (reviewing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289; Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593 (2010); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1987); Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972)).
92. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1280.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1297–98.
95. Id. at 1281.
96. Id. (“Finally, the cases urge a flexible, claim-by-claim approach to
subject-matter eligibility that avoids rigid line drawing. Bright-line rules may
be simple to apply, but they are often impractical and counter-productive
when applied to § 101.”).
97. Id.
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The court prescribed the following approach: after the
initial § 101 analysis of the statutory categories and judicial
exceptions has been conducted,98 the court must determine if
an abstract idea is incorporated in the claims of the patent and
unambiguously identify that abstract idea.99 The court must
then determine if there are additional substantive limitations
within the claims that reduce the coverage to less than the full
abstract idea itself.100 Minor human contribution, trivial post-
operation activity, and vague limitations will not be enough to
meet this requirement.101
The court then analyzed the series of patents under this
framework.102 In each case it found no significant limitations to
restrict the claims beyond the full scope of the abstract idea
involved and that the computer implementation did nothing to
add to the patent.103 The court concluded that the claims
covered abstract methods and used computers to implement
them and that “[a]bstract methods do not become patent-
eligible machines by being clothed in computer language.”104
III. ANALYSIS
A. FEDERAL CIRCUITOPINION
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Alice did a good
job of recognizing the broad issues in patenting abstract
ideas.105 Its basic analysis of § 101 lays the foundations for this
98. Id. at 1282.
99. Id.
100. Id. (“With the pertinent abstract idea identified, the balance of the
claim can be evaluated to determine whether it contains additional
substantive limitations that narrow, confine, or otherwise tie down the claim
so that, in practical terms, it does not cover the full abstract idea itself.”); see
also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1300 (2012) (discussing a patent-eligible process claim that involved a
law of nature but included additional steps “that confined the claims to a
particular, useful application of the principle.”).
101. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1283–84.
102. Id. at 1284–91.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1292.
105. See id. at 1276–78, 1280–82 (“As § 101 itself explains, the ultimate
question of patentability turns on whether, in addition to presenting a patent-
eligible invention, the inventor also satisfies ‘the conditions and requirements
of this tittle,’ namely, the novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure
requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112, among others.”).
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Comment’s proposed test of the patentability of abstract
ideas.106 A patent must meet the basic criteria for patentability
(the first prong of the test).107 The court recognized that “all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,”108
but that patents cannot claim an abstract idea so broadly that
it hinders rather than encourages invention.109 This analysis
will make up the second and third prongs of the proposed test
to determine § 101 validity.110
Despite its recognition of the broad issues and terse per
curiam opinion—stating that the claims in Alice were not
directed to eligible subject matter—the court failed to adopt a
rationale that a majority of the panel could support.111 The case
produced no less than five concurring and dissenting opinions,
as well as additional “reflections” by Chief Judge Rader.112
Every opinion, whether concurring or dissenting, took a
different approach on the reasoning the court should use.113
1. Judge Lourie’s Concurrence
Judge Lourie, joined by four other judges, wrote a
concurrence to the majority opinion holding that Alice Corp.’s
claims were patent-ineligible subject matter.114 After
106. See id. at 1276–77.
107. Id. at 1276.
108. Id. at 1277 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)).
109. Id.
110. Id. (“Accordingly, the basic steps in a patent eligibility analysis can be
summarized as follows. We must first ask whether the claimed invention is a
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. If not, the claim is
ineligible under § 101. If the invention falls within one of the statutory
categories, we must then determine whether any of the three judicial
exceptions nonetheless bars such a claim—is the claim drawn to a patent-
ineligible law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea? If so, the claim
is not patent eligible. Only claims that pass both inquiries satisfy § 101.”).
111. Id. at 1273 (“An equally divided court affirms the district court’s
holding that the asserted system claims are not directed to eligible subject
matter under that statute.”).
112. Id. at 1273–1336.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 1273–74 (Lourie, J., concurring) (“As described more fully below,
we would affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety and hold that the
method, computer-readable medium, and corresponding system claims before
us recite patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”).
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discussing § 101115 and the relevant case law,116 the
concurrence laid out its proposed framework for analyzing
whether a computer-implemented claim is actually patent-
eligible or merely an implementation of an abstract idea.117 The
beginning of the proposed analysis invoked two basic threshold
tests. The first is to determine that the patent does indeed fall
within one of the four statutory classes (process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter) laid out in § 101.118 The
second is to determine whether the patent implicates abstract
idea concerns at all.119
Judge Lourie sensibly pointed out that in many cases the
patent will raise no abstract idea issues and the analysis need
not proceed any further.120 If there are § 101 abstractness
concerns, Judge Lourie emphasized the importance
unambiguously identifying the abstract idea potentially
constrained.121 The amount of limitation allowed for a patent
may depend on the abstract idea so it is important to have the
abstract idea correctly identified.122
After that determination, Judge Lourie explained that the
focus should be on whether the claims narrow the scope of the
patent sufficiently so that it does not attempt to claim the
entire abstract idea.123 To determine whether the scope is
sufficiently narrow he focused on the “genuine human
contribution” or “inventive concept” in the claims.124 He took
pains to point out that “inventive concept” as applied to a § 101
eligibility analysis is different from the “inventiveness”
115. Id. at 1276–77.
116. Id. at 1277–82.
117. Id. at 1282–84.
118. Id. at 1282 (“The first question is whether the claimed invention fits
within one of the four statutory classes set out in § 101.”).
119. Id.
120. Id. (“Does the claim pose any risk of preempting an abstract idea? In
most cases, the answer plainly will be no.”).
121. Id. (“In short, one cannot meaningfully evaluate whether a claim
preempts an abstract idea until the idea supposedly at risk of preemption has
been unambiguously identified.”).
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 173 (1981) and Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)
as examples of patents that successfully made limited claims to an abstract
idea while contrasting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) as a patent
that did not).
124. Id. at 1283.
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required for sufficient novelty and nonobviousness under § 102
and § 103.125 Rather, the inventive concept in a § 101 analysis
is used to determine if the patent is sufficiently distinguished
from the abstract idea to be valid.126 Judge Lourie also added
that the inventive concept must be more than a “trivial
appendix” to be sufficient to allow the patent.127 He concluded
that none of the three types of patent claims in the suit
included sufficient inventive concept to distinguish them from
the basic abstract idea of hedging against risk.128
2. Chief Judge Rader’s Opinion
Chief Judge Rader wrote a concurrence-in-part, joined by
one judge, and a dissent-in-part, partially joined by two more
judges.129 His opinion upheld the decision that the method and
computer-readable medium claims were invalid but held that
the system claims were valid.130 The opinion laid out an
analysis framework focusing on whether the claims include
meaningful limitations on the scope of the patent.131
Foreshadowing his decision to uphold some of Alice Corp.’s
claims, Chief Judge Rader started off his analysis by
emphasizing the wide scope of § 101 eligibility.132 He pointed to
the broad categories in § 101 and the sweeping provision that
“any” process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
can be patented as evidence of Congressional intent to allow a
broad scope of patentable inventions.133 This is further
demonstrated by the 1952 amendments to the Patent Act
granting broad protections to processes, including processes
that contain a new use of an already existing invention.134
125. Id. at 1282.
126. Id. at 1283.
127. Id. (“In addition, that human contribution must represent more than
a trivial appendix to the underlying abstract idea.”).
128. Id. at 1284–92.
129. Id. at 1292.
130. Id. (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 1294–1305.
132. Id. at 1294.
133. Id. (“In ‘choosing such expansive terms . . . modified by the
comprehensive “any,” Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws
would be given wide scope.’”) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225
(2010)).
134. Id. at 1294–95. For additional background on the legislative history of
the 1952 amendment, see Alan J. Heinrich & Christopher T. Abernethy, The
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Chief Judge Rader also noted testimony before the United
States Senate during the passage of the amendments—quoted
by the Supreme Court in the Diehr opinion135—stating that
patent-eligible subject matter was intended to include
“anything that is under the sun that is made by man.”136 He
further noted the Supreme Court’s holding in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty stating that “[t]he subject-matter provisions of the
patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the
constitutional and statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress
of . . . the useful Arts . . . .’”137
After reviewing all of this evidence, Chief Judge Rader
restated his view that § 101 is to be construed broadly.138
Having established his position, Chief Judge Rader next turned
to the exceptions to the broad scope of § 101: “laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”139 He pointed out that
claims must be considered in their entirety since any claim,
when broken down far enough, can be reduced to simply an
abstract idea.140 His analysis focused on whether the claims
include “meaningful limitations” that limit the patent’s scope to
an application, and not the abstract idea generally,141 instead
of the human added “inventive concept” that Judge Lourie
focused on in his opinion.142
Chief Judge Rader laid out the boundaries of meaningful
limitations in a few ways, starting with what is not a
meaningful limitation. Claims that only describe or apply an
abstract idea and preempt all other uses of it are not
Myriad Reasons to Hit “Reset” on Patent-Eligibility Jurisprudence, 47 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 117, 128–30 (2013).
135. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
136. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1295.
137. Id. at 1297 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315
(1980)).
138. Id. (“In sum, any analysis of subject matter eligibility for patenting
must begin by acknowledging that any new and useful process, machine,
composition of matter, or manufacture, or an improvement thereof, is eligible
for patent protection. While a claim may not later meet the rigorous conditions
for patentability, Section 101 makes these broad categories of claimed subject
matter eligible for that consideration.”).
139. Id. (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 1298.
141. Id. at 1299–1300 (“The relevant inquiry must be whether a claim
includes meaningful limitations restricting it to an application, rather than
merely an abstract idea.”).
142. Id. at 1283.
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meaningful limitations.143 He cited the broadly applicable risk-
hedging patent in Bilski as an example.144 Similarly, he pointed
out that claims do not include a meaningful limitation if they
only spell out inconsequential additions such as the proper use
or target of the abstract idea.145 The last example given by
Chief Judge Rader of claims that are not meaningfully limited
are claims that are extremely general and provide no specific
guidance.146
Having addressed claims that are not meaningful
limitations, Chief Judge Rader then went on to cite examples of
claims that are meaningful limitations.147 The first is the
machine-or-transformation of matter test from Bilski.148 He
also cited claims that include limitations that are essential to
the patent, such as the rubber curing process in Diehr.149 While
addressing computer-implemented claims, Chief Judge Rader
pointed out that merely implementing an abstract idea on a
computer does not make it patent eligible, but implementing an
abstract idea in a particular way or using a specific computer
may allow it to be patented.150
As he finished laying out his analytical framework Chief
Judge Rader again emphasized the broad nature of § 101.151 He
emphasized that the exceptions for laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are judicially created and
should be construed narrowly to avoid thwarting Congressional
143. Id. at 1300.
144. Id. (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use
of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an
abstract idea.”) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)).
145. Id. at 1300–01.
146. Id. at 1301.
147. Id. at 1302 (“A special purpose computer, i.e., a new machine,
specially designed to implement a process may be sufficient.”).
148. Id. at 1301 (“This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue . . . for determining
whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101.”) (quoting Bilski,
130 S. Ct. at 3227).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1302 (“At bottom, where the claim is tied to a computer in such
a way that the computer plays a meaningful role in the performance of the
claimed invention, and the claim does not preempt virtually all uses of an
underlying abstract idea, the claim is patent eligible.”).
151. Id. at 1303 (“The Section 101 eligibility inquiry determines whether a
claim is limited meaningfully to permissible subject matter, as distinct from
the validity requirements of the other sections.”).
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intent.152 Under this framework Chief Judge Rader found Alice
Corp.’s system claims valid since they incorporate a machine,
the computer, and specific programmable software to carry out
a function: managing risk in trading.153 The specific nature of
the claims and the detailed implementation of the process
sufficiently distinguished the Alice Corp. patents from the
abstract idea under his analysis.154 For these reasons Chief
Judge Rader and the concurring judges believed the system
claims are in fact patent eligible.155 His analysis of the method
and computer-readable media claims concluded that those
claims, however, are too general and merely restate the
abstract idea of using escrow to mitigate risk.156 This renders
the method and computer-readable media claims patent
ineligible.157
3. Judge Moore’s Opinion
Judge Moore, joined by three other judges, filed a dissent-
in-part to Judge Lourie’s opinion.158 She believed that the
Lourie opinion construed the judicial exceptions to § 101, which
should be construed narrowly, far too broadly.159 Like Chief
Judge Rader, Judge Moore stated that the implementation of
an abstract idea into a specific machine renders it patent
eligible and held that the system claims were valid.160 Judge
Moore further warned that such broad construction of § 101
could completely destroy the ability to patent business
methods, financial systems, and software.161
152. Id. at 1303–04 (“As the Supreme Court has made clear, too broad an
interpretation of these exclusions from the statutory grant of Section 101
‘could eviscerate patent law.’”). These exceptions include the often cited “laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Id. at 1301 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012)).
153. Id. at 1305.
154. Id. at 1306–11.
155. Id. at 1311.
156. Id. at 1311–12.
157. Id. at 1312–13.
158. Id. at 1313 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1314–17.
161. Id. at 1313 (“And let’s be clear: if all of these claims, including the
system claims, are not patent-eligible, this case is the death of hundreds of
thousands of patents, including all business method, financial system, and
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4. Judge Newman’s Opinion
Judge Newman wrote a separate opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part.162 She decried the lack of a
standard test for § 101 patent eligibility and the incompatible
nature of the tests that have been created by the court.163 She
was primarily concerned that the lack of judicial consistency
will lead to increased patent litigation and discourage
inventors from trying to patent their inventions.164 She
proposed three basic principles for § 101 patent eligibility: that
§ 101 is inclusive and abstract idea patents will be eliminated
by other sections of the Patent Act;165 that the specific type of
claim has no bearing on patent eligibility;166 and that patented
information can be used for experimental purposes without
infringing on the patent.167 Judge Newman concluded that all
three types of claims in the Alice Corp. patents are valid under
§ 101, and the case should be remanded for determination
under the other sections of the Patent Act.168
5. Judge Linn’s Opinion
Judge Linn, joined by Judge O’Malley, dissented from the
majority opinion on all claims.169 These two judges were the
majority in the initial three-judge Federal Circuit opinion
software patents as well as many computer implemented and
telecommunications patents.”).
162. Id. at 1321 (Newman, J., concurring in part).
163. Id. (“The court, now rehearing this case en banc, hoped to ameliorate
this uncertainty by providing objective standards for section 101 patent-
eligibility. Instead we have propounded at least three incompatible standards,
devoid of consensus, serving simply to add to the unreliability and cost of the
system of patents as an incentive for innovation.”).
164. Id. (“The uncertainty of administrative and judicial outcome and the
high cost of resolution are a disincentive to both innovators and competitors.”).
165. Id. at 1322 (“The court should acknowledge the statutory purpose of
section 101, to provide an inclusive listing of the ‘useful arts.’ Then, upon
crossing this threshold into the patent system, examination of the particular
subject matter on the substantive criteria of patentability will eliminate
claims that are ‘abstract’ or ‘preemptive,’ on application of the laws of novelty,
utility, prior art, obviousness, description, enablement, and specificity.”).
166. Id. (“I propose that the court make clear that patent eligibility does
not depend on the form of the claim.”).
167. Id. (“I propose that the court reaffirm the long-standing rule that
study and experimentation are not infringement, whether the
experimentation is for basic or applied purposes.”).
168. Id. at 1327.
169. Id. (Linn, J., concurring in part).
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upholding the Alice Corp. patents, so it is unsurprising that
they supported the claims in this opinion as well.170 Judge
Linn’s dissent stated that the majority erroneously departed
from the record established by the trial court.171 After a
detailed analysis of the district court proceedings,172 Judge
Linn explained that both the Lourie and Rader opinions
diverged from the record and construed the claims far too
broadly.173 Under the same reasoning that upheld the system
claims in the Rader opinion,174 the Linn opinion held that the
method and media claims should be valid as well.175
B. POLICY ANALYSIS
Evaluating software patents is made more difficult by
conflicting public policy goals.176 There is the traditional
balance between the private interest in benefiting from the
creation of novel inventions and the public interest in not
allowing property rights and ideas to be tied up by a few patent
holders.177 This balance takes on a new twist with the ability of
170. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 685 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“[T]his court concludes that the system, method, and media claims at
issue are not drawn to mere ‘abstract ideas’ but rather are directed to
practical applications of invention falling within the categories of patent
eligible subject matter defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101.”).
171. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1327.
172. Id. at 1327–29.
173. Id. at 1329–32.
174. See supra text accompanying note 155.
175. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1332 (“For the reasons we describe herein,
moreover, we would employ the same rationale we employed for the system
claims to find the method and media claims patent eligible as well.”).
176. See id. at 1277. (“Thus, even inventions that fit within one or more of
the statutory categories are not patent eligible if drawn to a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea. The underlying concern is that
patents covering such elemental concepts would reach too far and claim too
much, on balance obstructing rather than catalyzing innovation.”).
177. E.g., Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It
Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 160 (2004) (“[T]he current
patent system strikes a balance between the positive incentive effects that will
redound to the public benefit and any negative effects that the creation of
patent rights may produce.”); see Mike Ervin, US Patents—A Brief History:
The US Patent Office, BUS. PATS., http://www.the-business-of-patents.com/us
-patents.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (“[A]n invention needed to be new
and useful, as well as ‘non-obvious’ to be granted a patent. This amendment,
which required patents to be non-obvious, was implemented to keep
individuals from taking ownership or taking away from the base pool of
knowledge in a particular field.”); Brief History, supra note 18.
2015] CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL 529
software to possess no physical characteristic, only manifesting
itself in the physical world through the ideas and
manipulations it incorporates.178
1. Encouraging Innovation Versus the Public Good
One of the classic tensions since the creation of patents has
been the pull between inventors, who want to have as broad a
property right as possible to protect their inventions, and the
public, who want a narrow property to right to allow use and
development of the inventions by others or without paying
royalty fees.179 This is increasingly true in the information age,
where computers and software are permeating every facet of
society.180 From computer controlled manufacturing processes
like those found in Diehr,181 to online websites,182 to apps on
smartphones,183 abstract ideas are being implemented in
software everywhere we look.184
The software market is increasing every year.185 This
affects both sides of the inventor versus public equation. There
is a huge market for software patents186 with intense
178. Hardware vs. Software, DIFFEN, http://www.diffen.com/difference
/Hardware_vs_Software (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
179. See Brief History, supra note 18 (describing the development of patent
law through a series of reforms struggling to balance the inventor’s profits and
society’s needs).
180. Wes Lambert, Computers Are Everywhere, TEK HANDY (June 27,
2013), http://www.tekhandy.com/computers-are-everywhere (“It wasn’t but
two generations ago that computers were only making the first strides into
our lives, but now they surround us.”).
181. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
182. See generally Products, SYMPLICITY, http://www.symplicity.com
/products (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (listing examples of web-based
application software available).
183. See generally Google Play, GOOGLE, https://play.google.com/store/apps
(last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (listing the top apps in various categories for
Android mobile devices).
184. See Devan R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D
Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691 (2014) for an
innovative discussion of the many legal questions that may arise in patents
and other areas of law when digital mediums can be turned back into physical
things by individuals with new technologies like 3D printing.
185. Global Software, REPORT LINKER (Apr. 2014), http://www.reportlinker
.com/p0188773-summary/Global-Software.html (reporting that the global
software market grew 11.3% annually between 2009 and 2013 and is expected
to grow 9.2% annually between 2013 and 2018).
186. Id. (reporting that the global software market had total revenues of
$554.5 billion in 2013).
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competition.187 Increasingly, patent markets are spurred
onward by non-creative investors, rather than inventors.188
Inventors are eager to patent their inventions and cash in on
them.189 Inventors are also wary of their competitors and aware
that weak or narrow patent protection will leave them
vulnerable to competitors.190 Thus, the broad and diverse
market for software patents magnifies the traditional private
inventor interest in strong, broad patents.
The public interest, on the other hand, has also magnified.
Software development, especially for mobile devices, is no
longer the provenance of a few big companies.191 Medium and
small businesses, as well as individuals, are heavily involved in
the software market.192 This large array of developers leaves
many opportunities for new, novel, and useful software
patents.193 Even a free mobile app can yield a profit over the
course of many downloads.194
187. See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-w
ars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html; see also Software
Developers, BUREAU LAB. STAT., U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB. (Jan. 8, 2014),
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Computer-and-Information-Technology/Software-devel
opers.htm (reporting 1,018,000 software development jobs in 2012 and
predicting a twenty-two percent growth rate through 2022).
188. Yuichi Watanabe, Patent Licensing and the Emergence of a New
Patent Market, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 445, 479 (2009) (“The emergence of
patent licensing firms demonstrates a positive progression in response to the
demands of the patent licensing market, which historically has been
dominated by large corporations.”).
189. See generally Mary Bellis, Turning an Invention Idea into Money,
Lesson Eight: How Do I Make Money From My Invention?, ABOUT.COM
INVENTORS, http://inventors.about.com/od/fundinglicensingmarketing/a
/Making_Money.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (describing the ways an
inventor can make money from an invention). But see Watanabe, supra note
188, at 477–79.
190. See Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 187 (describing the effects of recent
increases in litigation over software patents).
191. See Carl Erickson, The Size of Software Product Development
Companies, GREAT NOT BIG (Mar. 24, 2011), http://greatnotbig.com/2011
/03/the-size-of-software-product-development-companies (“It’s pretty clear
from eye-balling the data above that there are a whole lot of small companies
in our segment and relatively few large ones.”).
192. See id.
193. The lack of large software developers leaves many opportunities for
smaller developers to find a niche or unmet need in the software market. See
id. But see Watanabe, supra note 188, at 445 (noting that opportunities exist
for small companies or individuals to make valid patents, but these small
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There are valid arguments on both sides of the inventor
versus public balancing test.195 It is an important
consideration, but other factors will clearly have to be
examined as well.
2. The Difficulty of Analyzing the Use of Abstract Ideas
Patents are required to claim a “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.”196 Before the
information age, a patent almost always had to be tied to some
kind of physical device.197 This made it relatively easy to
distinguish one patent from another.198
With the arrival of computers, that changed.199 Now the
same generic hardware can be used to run different programs,
with limited exceptions.200 Alternatively, the same programs
patent holders may face barriers becoming competitive in the patent
marketplace because of large companies).
194. Tero Kuittinen, Missing the Dazzling Profit Potential of Free Apps,
BGR (Nov. 19, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://bgr.com/2012/11/19/mobile-app-market
-analysis-free-apps (“This past year has proven that free apps are more
profitable than paid apps.”).
195. See Brief History, supra note 18 (describing the conflicting and valid
aims of protecting individual inventors’ rights and the public good).
196. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
197. See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 184, at 1691–93; John Perry
Barlow, Economy of Ideas, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03
/economy.ideas_pr.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (“A patent, until recently,
was either a description of the form into which materials were to be rendered
in the service of some purpose, or a description of the process by which
rendition occurred. In either case, the conceptual heart of patent was the
material result. If no purposeful object could be rendered because of some
material limitation, the patent was rejected . . . . It had to be a thing, and the
thing had to work.”).
198. Cf. Charles A. Bieneman, Patent Practice Lessons from Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank, SOFTWARE INTELLECTUAL PROP. REP. (June 22, 2014),
http://swipreport.com/for-non-lawyers/patents (“Infringement of a software
patent can be difficult to prove, sometimes requiring detailed and complicated
journeys through source code.”).
199. See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 184, at 1691–99.
200. Multitasking and Multiprocessing, MICROSOFT TECHNET,
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc767883.aspx (last visited Nov. 8,
2014) (“On a single-processor multitasking system, multiple processes don’t
actually run at the same time since there’s only one processor. Instead, the
processor switches among the processes that are active at any given time.
Because computers are so fast compared with people, however, it appears to
the user as though the computer is executing all of the tasks at once.”).
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could be used on multiple different types of computers.201 In
light of these developments, the courts had to begin examining
the ideas behind a program rather than merely analyzing its
physical elements or operation.202 In cases like Benson and
Flook, the courts ruled that even though the patent may have
been novel and nonobvious, at its core, it claimed an abstract
idea.203
However, courts have failed to specify a consistent test for
abstract ideas.204 In Morse, the Supreme Court discussed the
invalidation of the Nielsen patent for a blast furnace.205 The
Nielsen patent was struck down because it failed to specify a
best or particular method for constructing the forge, or heating
and directing the air, and merely recited a general principle.206
In Kalo, the Court held that qualities and manifestations of
natural phenomena are not patentable because they are free to
all men.207 In Benson, the patent was invalidated because the
Court held it effectively constituted a patent on a mathematical
formula.208 The patent in Flook was struck down because it
failed to include an inventive concept to distinguish it from a
mere implementation of an abstract idea.209 The Diehr patent
was upheld because the abstract idea was part of a larger
process for curing rubber.210 The risk-hedging in Bilski was
struck down as an attempted monopoly on an abstract idea.211
201. Cory Janssen, Porting, TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com
/definition/8925/porting (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (“Porting is the process of
adapting software in an environment for which it was not originally written or
intended to execute in.”).
202. See Copyrighting Software vs. Patenting Software, HARV. U. OFF.
TECH. DEV., http://otd.harvard.edu/inventions/ip/software/compare (last
visited Aug. 22, 2014) (“Increasingly software is being described as a collection
of processes, as a unique machine, or both, enabling the protection of the
inventive concepts behind an original program.”).
203. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1987); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972).
204. Charles Bieneman, supra note 198 (“[T]he ‘abstract idea’ test is vague
and subjective, and its application in Alice Corp. leaves many questions
relating to patent-eligibility frustratingly unanswered.”).
205. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 114–16 (1853).
206. Id. at 115–16.
207. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
208. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72.
209. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1987).
210. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192–93 (1981).
211. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–12 (2010).
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While the Supreme Court has declined to provide an
explicit test, some general principles can be derived from its
precedent. A patent that is essentially an abstract idea is not
valid.212 Mere implementation on a computer is not enough to
save a patent.213 An abstract idea coupled with some other
inventive concept214 or incorporated into an industrial
process215 has a better chance of surviving challenge.
C. SUPREME COURTDECISION
The Federal Circuit’s fractured opinions in Alice accurately
reflect the fractured case law on the subject of software
incorporating abstract ideas.216 After the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, observers hoped the Supreme Court would
finally take a clear position on the issue217 and perhaps even
address the larger issue of the patentability of software in
general.218 Many were skeptical that the Supreme Court would
issue a broad ruling on the matter and would instead rule
narrowly on the facts of the case.219
212. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132
S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 608–11; Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333
U.S. at 131–32.
213. See Benson, 408 U.S. at 71–72.
214. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
215. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–93.
216. See Evan Finkel, Federal Circuit’s Split Decision on Software Patents
in CLS Bank Satisfied No One and Confused All, PILLSBURY L. (May, 28
2013), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/AlertMay2013IP
FederalCircuitsSplitDecisionOnSoftwarePatentInCLSBankSatisfiedNoOneAn
dConfusedAll.pdf (“The Federal Circuit and the district courts have been
struggling with the issue for the last three years, rendering decisions that are
simply irreconcilable with one another. Federal Circuit panels called upon to
determine the patent-eligibility of computer-implemented inventions based on
similar fact patterns often arrived at contradictory conclusions, some finding
the patent claims patent-eligible and others finding the opposite.”) (citation
omitted).
217. See, e.g., Brian Fung, The Supreme Court’s Decision on Software
Patents Still Doesn’t Settle the Bigger Question, WASH. POST (June 20, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/06/20/the-supreme
-courts-decision-on-software-patents-still-doesnt-settle-the-bigger-question
(“What many were hoping for was some kind of legal test from the court that
would help businesses determine what kinds of software could be patented.”).
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., Michael Borella, Supreme Court Grants Cert. in Alice Corp.
v. CLS Bank Intl., PAT. DOCS (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.patentdocs.org
/2013/12/supreme-court-grants-cert-in-alice-corp-v-cls-bank-intl.html (“It is
possible, if not likely, that the Supreme Court will provide an opinion focused
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In the opinion, the Court acknowledged that it must avoid
the monopolization of the building blocks of innovation without
destroying patent law by invalidating every patent that
incorporates any abstract idea.220 The Court stated that its goal
is to separate patents that claim the “‘buildin[g] block[s]’ of
human ingenuity from those that integrate the building blocks
into something more, thereby transform[ing] them into a
patent-eligible invention.”221 Patents that claim the building
blocks of human ingenuity are invalid.222 Patents that
integrate the building blocks into a larger invention pose no
risk of preempting them and may safely be granted.223
The Court drew heavily on the Mayo decision to analyze
the facts in Alice.224 Specifically, the Court revitalized the two-
step test from Mayo for separating patents that claim abstract
ideas from patents that only claim patent-eligible applications
of them.225 The first step is to determine if the claims include a
patent-ineligible abstract idea.226 If so, courts must then
determine if the claims contain an additional “inventive
concept” that separates the patent from the abstract idea.227
Having selected the Mayo test, the Court then applied it to
the facts in Alice.228 Applying the first step, the Court
examined Alice Corp.’s patents with respect to the abstract idea
of intermediated settlement.229 It cited the mathematical
algorithm in Benson, the mathematical formula in Flook, and
the business method in Bilski as examples of other abstract
on the facts of the case, narrow in scope, and just different enough from
Prometheus to oblige the Federal Circuit to conduct yet another round of § 101
soul searching.”).
220. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2354–55.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 2355.
225. Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012)).
226. Id. (“We must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.”).
227. Id. (“We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an
‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.’”).
228. Id. at 2356–60.
229. Id. at 2356.
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ideas.230 Based on the similarity between these cases and Alice,
the Court concluded that the claims were directed to the
abstract idea of intermediated settlement.231
The Court made short work of Alice Corp.’s argument that
abstract ideas are limited to scientific and natural principles
which are “preexisting, fundamental truth[s]” that “exis[t] in
principle apart from any human action.”232 Alice Corp. was
arguing that its business method did not fall in the category of
abstract ideas that cannot be patented.233 The Court pointed
out that the concept of risk-hedging in Bilski was also a
“method of organizing human activity” rather than a
transcendent natural principle and that patent had been struck
down as claiming an abstract idea.234 The Court declined to
engage in an extended analysis of abstract ideas and simply
stated that the concept of intermediated settlement at hand
was similar enough to the risk-hedging in Bilski that both were
clearly abstract ideas.235
Since Alice Corp.’s claims were directed to an abstract
idea, the Court then turned to the search for a transformative
inventive concept to render the application patent-eligible.236
Drawing from Mayo, the Court stated that an inventive concept
must include additional features to distinguish the patent from
the abstract idea; it cannot merely be a simple statement of the
abstract idea with the words “apply it,” and it must do more
than add conventional steps stated generally.237 Reviewing
Benson, Flook, and Diehr, the Court noted that implementing
an abstract idea on a computer will not save a patent.238
Benson and Flook were struck down on this basis while Diehr
was upheld, not because it was implemented on a computer,
230. Id. at 2355–56.
231. Id. at 2356 (“[T]he concept of intermediated settlement [is] the use of
a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”).
232. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012)).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2356–57 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3218 (2010)).
235. Id. (“Like the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of intermediated
settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commerce.’”) (citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218 and numerous economic and
financial analysis materials generally).
236. Id. at 2357.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2357–58.
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but because it improved an existing industrial process.239 The
Court then combined these two principles to conclude that
adding “apply it with a computer” to an abstract idea will not
transform the idea into a patent-eligible invention.240
After establishing this groundwork, the Court turned to
the final question of whether Alice Corp.’s claims did more than
apply an abstract idea with a computer.241 The Court concluded
they did not.242 The steps performed by the computer such as
electronic recordkeeping, obtaining and manipulating data, and
issuing automated instructions fell into the category of “purely
conventional.”243 This is the same category as the steps that
failed to save the patents in Mayo.244 Alice Corp.’s method
claims did nothing to improve the computer.245 It was simply
present as an instrument to execute a patent-ineligible abstract
idea.246 The opinion concluded with a brief section invalidating
the system and media claims,247 and a one-paragraph
concurrence stating that business methods do not qualify for
patent protection, as seen in Bilski.248
And that is that. The Court declined to address the larger
issue of software patents, clarify what is or is not an abstract
idea,249 or even add much clarity to the Mayo test.250 After all,
much of the analysis in Alice involved quotes directly from the
239. Id. (“In other words, the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because
they improved an existing technological process, not because they were
implemented on a computer.”).
240. Id. at 2358 (“These cases demonstrate that the mere recitation of a
generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea ‘while adding the words
apply it’ is not enough for patent eligibility. Stating an abstract idea while
adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply combines those two steps,
with the same deficient result.”) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)).
241. Id. at 2359.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2359–60.
246. Id. at 2360.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 2360–61 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).
249. See id. at 2357 (“In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”).
250. Id. The Court may have, at the least, expanded the application of the
test by comparing the facts of Mayo and the present case. Id. (“Mayo itself is
instructive.”).
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Mayo opinion.251 Despite the fact that the patents at hand were
for software, the Court did little to discuss or even mention
software.252 Instead, the Court focused on computers
themselves.253 In short, the Supreme Court affirmed the Mayo
test, but did little to explicitly craft precedent that would help
apply the test in future cases based on similar facts.254
Responses from academics and lawyers have been mixed.
Some observers gave the Alice opinion credit for making it clear
that incorporating an abstract idea on a computer will not be
patent eligible unless it actually improves the computer.255
Others did not disparage it, but commented that it failed to
provide much clarity on the subject.256 Many were openly
251. See, e.g., id. at 2354–55.
252. See, e.g., id. at 2352 (“Petitioner Alice Corporation is the assignee of
several patents that disclose schemes to manage certain forms of financial
risk. According to the specification largely shared by the patents, the
invention ‘enables the management of risk relating to specified, yet unknown,
future events.’ The specification further explains that the ‘invention relates to
methods and apparatus, including electrical computers and data processing
systems applied to financial matters and risk management.’”) (citations
omitted).
253. Id. at 2357 (“The introduction of a computer into the claims does not
alter the analysis atMayo step two.”).
254. Analysis of Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International,
FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG LLP (June 25, 2014), http://www.flhlaw.com
/Analysis-of-Alice-Corporation-Pty-Ltd-v-CLS-Bank-International-06-25-2014/
(“While the decision does not completely abrogate the ability to patent
business methods or software, the Supreme Court stayed true to its
precedents by making clear that the ‘mere recitation’ of some generic
technological structure does not transform an abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter. But the opinion provides little guidance on what
exactly constitutes an ‘abstract idea.’ Thus, it is likely that there will be
further litigation in the near future to provide clarity on what constitutes an
abstract idea under § 101, especially in the realm of software and business
methods.”).
255. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Saying ‘Do It On A Computer’ Not Enough to
Save Patent, Supreme Court Rules, FORBES (June 19, 2014, 11:53 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/06/19/saying-do-it-on-a-comp
uter-not-enough-for-a-patent-supreme-court-rules (“[T]he court made it utterly
clear that simply applying an abstract idea to computers won’t work unless
the patent covers a process that makes the computers run more effectively.”).
256. See, e.g., id. (“Today they closed the circle in Mayo and Bilski and
brought a grand unifying approach . . . . Usually when you get a grand
unifying theory, you get clarity. Not here.”); Daniel Nazer & Vera Ranieri, Bad
Day for Bad Patents: Supreme Court Unanimously Strikes Down Abstract
Software Patent, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 19, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/bad-day-bad-patents-supreme-court
-unanimously-strikes-down-abstract-software (“Admittedly, the Supreme
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critical of the Court’s failure to address any issues beyond the
facts of this case.257 One law professor went as far as to
compare the “depth of the non-answer” in the Alice opinion to
the computer’s bizarre and opaque answer of “42” when asked
“What is the meaning of life?” in the novel, The Hitchhiker’s
Guide to the Galaxy.258 While it may provide some guidance,
the patent community will have to wait for another case for
more clarity on patents of abstract ideas.
D. PROPOSED TEST
Due to the significance of this issue for software patents
many interested parties had hoped that the Supreme Court
would set forth a clear test for the patentability of software
that incorporates abstract ideas.259 The ongoing uncertainty in
the case law in this area has left many software developers
unsure about the ongoing viability of the patents they have
been granted or the patentability of their future inventions.260
Accordingly, the next time they are confronted with this issue
Court did not offer the clearest guidance on when a patent claims merely an
abstract idea.”).
257. See, e.g., Fung, supra note 217 (“It was supposed to be the most
important patent case of the decade . . . . It turned out to be a little bit like
fireworks that fizzled. It didn’t really seem to move the needle much either
way.”); Brad Greenberg, TWITTER (June 19, 2014, 10:04 AM),
https://twitter.com/bradagreenberg/status/479640933726973952 (“That
obscurity, coupled w/ ‘we need not labor to delimit,’ translates to: someone else
figure it out, see ya in 5 years”).
258. See Rob Merges, Symposium: Go Ask Alice—What Can You Patent
After Alice v. CLS Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 20, 2014, 12:04 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you
-patent-after-alice-v-cls-bank (“Reading the opinion reminds me of a famous
passage in The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. Acolytes wait at the feet of a
giant supercomputer, which 7.5 million years before had been asked ‘What is
the meaning of life?’ Finally, after eons of waiting, the computer spoke. Its
answer was: ‘42.’ The acolytes went forth, armed with this non-answer. And
life went on. So it is with us, in the patent field. We have met our ‘42,’ and its
name is Alice. Now life must go on.”); see also DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE
HITCHHIKER’SGUIDE TO THEGALAXY 181 (Del Rey Books 2005) (1979).
259. See Sally Abel et al., Intellectual Property Bulletin—Spring 2013:
Federal Circuit Undecided About Whether Software Is Patentable?, JD SUPRA
(June 26, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/intellectual-property
-bulletin-spring-43926 (“A grant of certiorari, then, may signal the Supreme
Court’s desire to provide a substantive opinion on the patentability of
software.”).
260. See id. (“Patent holders, inventors, and even the courts have recently
struggled with the limits of what can be patented.”).
2015] CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL 539
the Supreme Court should adopt the following modified version
of the three-prong test laid out in the Federal Circuit Court’s
decision of Alice261 instead of the more vague Mayo test they
used this time.
1. Retain Threshold Tests
The threshold tests for patentable subject matter discussed
in Alice form the first prong of the proposed test. The first part
of this prong is to determine if the invention falls within the
four statutory classes of matter discussed in § 101: process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.262 If the
invention falls within one of the statutory classes it should also
be evaluated for novelty under § 102,263 and then obviousness
under § 103.264
This prong will serve a purpose similar to that of the legal
concept of standing required in civil suits.265 Much like
standing, if a patent case can be dismissed at this point for
failure to fall within a statutory class of matter, lack of novelty,
or obviousness then the case need not be decided on the
merits.266 Thus, a court need not reach the more complex issue
of whether the software improperly incorporates an abstract
idea.
2. Determine Substantial Usage of Abstract Ideas
Once a patent has been given a presumption of validity,267
it must then be evaluated for its content of abstract ideas.
Many patents will clearly not contain any abstract ideas or will
261. See generally CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1282–
84. (Fed. Cir. 2013).
262. Id. at 1282; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
263. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1282; 35 U.S.C. § 102.
264. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1282; 35 U.S.C. § 103.
265. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1280–81 (analyzing first whether the
subject matter fits within these four categories to determine if the analysis
need continue).
266. See Standing, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL UNIV. (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:24
PM), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/standing (“Only those with enough direct
stake in an action or law have ‘standing’ to challenge it. A decision that a
party does not have sufficient stake to sue will commonly be put in terms of
the party’s lacking ‘standing.’”).
267. CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d at 1284 (“[I]t bears remembering that all
issued patent claims receive a statutory presumption of validity.”).
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not come close to foreclosing an abstract idea.268 These patent
suits, like the ones that fail the threshold tests, can then easily
be dismissed without requiring a court to proceed to examine
the merits.269
Determining whether an invention substantially
incorporates an abstract idea will require analysis of the
principles involved270 and how thoroughly they are
incorporated.271 For example, a medieval inventor filing a
patent for his newly invented counterweight trebuchet would
be utilizing many abstract ideas from physics such as potential
energy, force, torque, and Newton’s Second Law.272 But he
would not substantially incorporate any of those concepts, only
execute them.
On the other hand, a computer program that converts
numbers from binary-coded decimal numbers into pure
binary—such as that found in Benson—could be said to
substantially incorporate an abstract idea.273 The abstract idea
incorporated is not merely incidental to the operation of the
system but essential and central to its operation.
Substantial usage of abstract ideas can be tested according
to two related factors. The first factor is the abstractness of the
patent itself. Patents that include a device or tangible elements
in the physical world such as a telegraph or trebuchet would be
at less risk of substantially incorporating an abstract idea.274
Patents that are more abstract such as a method for
268. See id. at 1282.
269. Cf. Stefan Blum, Ex Parte Reexamination: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 395, 425–28 (2012) (changing expectations about litigation
outcome without getting to the merits would likely impact patent infringers’
litigation strategy or amenability to settlement).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 121–22.
271. See supra text accompanying note 123.
272. Trebuchet Physics, REALWORLD PHYSICS PROBLEMS, http://www.real
-world-physics-problems.com/trebuchet-physics.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2014).
273. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64–67 (1972); Alice Corp. Pty.
v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
274. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 70–71 (1853) (describing
the elements of the Morse telegraph including a table, frame, electromagnet,
battery, and wire); Trebuchet Physics, supra note 272 (providing a diagram
showing a frame, beam, heavy counterweight, sling, and pouch).
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transmitting signals electronically at a distance,275 converting
binary-coded decimal numbers to pure binary,276 or hedging
business risk277 are more likely to substantially incorporate an
abstract idea because there is not much else in the patent to
distinguish its scope from the abstract idea itself.278 The more
abstract and less tangible the patent, the more difficult it will
be to prove it is a valid patent.279
The second factor will be centrality of the abstract idea to
the patent.280 If the abstract idea is not central to the operation
of the patent there is no substantial usage.281 The trebuchet
example previously discussed depends on abstract physical
principles, but those principles are not central to its actual
operation.282 Even a much more abstract method such as card
counting, which depends heavily on the mathematical
principles of probability, does not utilize them for its actual
operation.283 Patents that substantially use an abstract idea
will often be patents like those found in Benson or Bilski where
the central operation of the patent is essentially executing the
abstract idea incorporated.284 These patents lack either a
275. See Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 86 (Morse’s eighth claim explicitly did
not limit the patent to any specific machinery and instead claimed generally
using electric current to transmit characters at a distance).
276. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 64–67.
277. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 597–600 (2010).
278. See Stephen Pulley, An “Exclusive” Application of an Abstract Idea:
Clarification of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter after Bilski v. Kappos, 2011
BYU L. REV. 1223, 1256–57 (making a similar argument in the wake of Bilski,
561 U.S., concluding that more cleanly defined patent validity exclusionary
rules would lead to application of the “abstract ideas” framework under § 101
“in a more constitutionally sound manner amid the growth of the Information
Age.”).
279. See id. at 611–13; Benson, 409 U.S. at 72–73.
280. For example, abstract ideas and process under § 101 can be separated,
although the distinction goes to arcane early English law. See Alice Corp. Pty.
v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., joined by
Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., concurring).
281. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1302 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
282. See Trebuchet Physics, supra note 272.
283. Cf. Card Counting, WIZARD ODDS, http://wizardofodds.com/games
/blackjack/card-counting/introduction (last updated Oct. 27, 2009)
(“Experienced card counters still play by the basic strategy the great majority
of the time.”).
284. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 597–600 (discussing calculations for hedging
risk by attempting to reduce financial loss caused by price fluctuations in
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physical element or other additional elements significantly
distinguishing them from the abstract idea they incorporate.285
3. Evaluate Whether the Claim Unduly Burdens Use of the
Abstract Idea by Others
This step is the most important because it specifically
addresses whether the patent restricts the ability of abstract
ideas to remain “free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.”286 A patent can have a presumption of patentability,
substantially incorporate an abstract idea, and still avoid
unduly burdening the use of that abstract idea by other
inventors.287 It is the patents that make it difficult or
impossible for others to utilize the abstract idea that must be
identified and invalidated.288
The key factor for this step is how thoroughly the patent
forecloses the use of the abstract idea. This can be measured by
examining the difference between the abstract idea itself and
the final incorporation included in the patent.289 There must be
a substantial creative difference between the idea in the
abstract or incorporated as calculations on paper and the usage
in the invention.290 An invention that merely takes advantage
of the information in the abstract idea or scientific principle is
not patentable.291 An invention that simply executes an
abstract algorithm, no differently than it could be executed
with pen and paper, is not patentable.292 An invention that only
commodities markets); Benson, 409 U.S. at 65–67 (conversion of binary-coded
decimal numbers to pure binary).
285. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 72–73.
286. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
287. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (upholding a
patent on a process for curing rubber using an application of the Arrhenius
equation).
288. See generally Benson, 409 U.S. at 72 (“[T]he patent would wholly
preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent
on the algorithm itself.”).
289. Id. at 72–73.
290. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611–13.
291. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 62, 115–16 (1853).
292. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611–13; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72.
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executes unrelated operations293 or adds routine additional
steps294 is not patentable.
The patent must incorporate the abstract idea in such a
way that it is distinguishable from the idea by itself and leaves
the idea free to be used by others.295 This may be by
incorporating it in a device296 or some other physical
implementation.297 It may also be accomplished by
incorporating it in an industrial process that produces a useful
product.298 A piece of software may use an abstract idea in
combination with novel data to produce a useful result.299 All of
these incorporations leave room for use of the abstract idea in
other devices, methods, or pieces of software without
impermissibly foreclosing their use.300
The details of this test can be examined by applying them
as an example to the method that a Global Positioning System
(GPS) uses to calculate location. GPS uses an abstract
geometrical principle called trilateration.301 Trilateration in
two dimensions allows the calculation of a location based on the
knowledge that a point lies on the perimeter of three different
circles (i.e., a distance of each circle’s radius away from that
circle’s center) because those three circles can only intersect at
one point.302 A similar process can be used with four spheres in
three dimensions.303
293. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1987).
294. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1291 (2012).
295. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130.
296. See Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 85–87 (describing how abstract ideas
are implemented into the physical aspects of Morse’s telegraph design).
297. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192–93 (1981).
298. Id.
299. See generally Patrick Bertagna, How Does a GPS Tracking System
Work?, EE TIMES (Oct. 26, 2010, 1:25 PM), http://www.eetimes.com/document
.asp?doc_id=1278363 (explaining how the mathematical principles of
trilateration are used to calculate location based on GPS satellite signals).
300. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (holding that
patents on processes must be such that other processes are able to use the
same abstract idea).
301. What Is Trilateration?, ROSE INDIA TECH. PVT. LTD. (Feb. 15, 2008),
http://roseindia.net/technology/gps/what-is-trilateration.shtml (“GPS receivers
calculate the position of objects in two dimensional or three dimensional space
using a mathematical process called trilateration.”).
302. Id.
303. Id.
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GPS depends on a constellation of twenty-four satellites
that rotate around the earth.304 These satellites send out
location and timing signals received by GPS receivers.305
Provided that the receiver can receive signals from at least four
satellites, it then uses the principles of three-dimensional
trilateration to calculate location based on the location and
distance to each satellite.306
GPS, whether evaluated as a device or a method,
incorporates the abstract geometrical principle of
trilateration.307 It does not use trilateration in a rote way to
calculate an abstract location based on the location and
distance of an abstract set of points.308 Rather it uses the input
from GPS satellites to calculate useful information—the precise
location of a GPS receiver on or above the Earth’s surface.309
The GPS patent only claims the use of trilateration for
“determining the positions of a plurality of vehicles traveling on
or above a defined sector of the earth’s surface.”310 It makes no
claims to the general use of trilateration.311 Other users are
still free to use trilateration for land surveying,312 allowing
robots to locate each other,313 or any other potential use. In this
example GPS has not unduly burdened the use of an abstract
idea by others.
304. Bertagna, supra note 299.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See id.
308. See What Is Trilateration?, supra note 301.
309. See Bertagna, supra note 299.
310. Satellite-Based Vehicle Position Determining System, U.S. Patent No.
4,359,733 (filed Sept. 23, 1980) (issued Nov. 16, 1982), available at
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=
PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=
4359733.PN.&OS=PN/4359733&RS=PN/4359733.
311. See id.
312. See David DiBiase et al., Trilateration, PA. ST. U., http://www.e-edu
cation.psu.edu/natureofgeoinfo/c5_p12.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
313. See PAULM.MAXIM ET AL., TRILATERATION LOCALIZATION FORMULTI-
ROBOT TEAMS (2008), available at http://homepages.ius.edu/suhettia
/papers/icinco.pdf.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The software development industry is large, dynamic, and
rapidly growing. It affects almost every aspect of our daily
lives.314 This industry faces unique challenges in patenting its
products due to the intangible nature of software.315 Yet, the
Supreme Court has failed to propagate a clear test on how to
evaluate software patents that implement abstract ideas
despite the high hopes for the Alice ruling.316 This uncertainty
threatens the future of software patents and discourages the
very innovation patents are intended to create.317 To restore
software patents to a firm footing, the Supreme Court should
set as the standard the three-prong test proposed in this
Comment.
This test immediately invalidates patents that fail to
qualify under § 101 and that have little or no relation to an
abstract idea. It then proceeds to an analysis of the abstract
idea claimed and whether it unduly burdens its use by others.
The test eliminates spurious claims while balancing the
interests of the inventor and the public to encourage innovation
while leaving the laws of nature free to all.
314. See Global Software, supra note 185.
315. See Matt Flinders, Protecting Computer Software—Analysis and
Proposed Alternative, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 71, 74 (2007) (“The unique
characteristics of software, however, create troubling conflicts under
[intellectual property laws].”).
316. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
317. Ling Cheung Hughes & James H. Morris, No, ‘Alice’ Wasn’t a ‘Death
Knell’ for Software Patents, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.national
lawjournal.com/id=1202669092811/No-Alice-Wasnt-a-Death-Knell-for-Softwar
e-Patents?slreturn=20140919235617 (“Worried inventors, companies and
investors have been reconsidering business and intellectual property
strategies for fear that computer-implemented inventions are no longer
eligible for patents.”).
